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Abstract 
In this work, the power and independence of the Commission are investigated from 
three perspectives which are the reflection of the supranational dimension of the EU. 
The first is theoretical perspective that includes two main approaches. The second is 
the historical (and functional) perspective, and the impact of the member states on 
the Commission’s officials is the third perspective.  
By looking from the theoretical perspective, especially through 
intergovernmentalist approach, it can be seen that, the power of the European 
Commission has and must have an insignificant role. The member states know that, if 
they want to obtain integration of the European Union in all fields they will need a 
powerful, independent and supranational Commission. However, the historical and 
functional perspective demonstrates that, due to their national interests, the member 
states are not eager to strengthen the Commission. From the third perspective all the 
indications show that member states’ interests are more important than the European 
Union’s interests according to commissioners. 
Key words: European Commission, Supranationalism, EU, independent institution 
 
1. Introduction 
The structure of the European Union (EU) resembles a familiar national system having 
a council, a parliament and a court of justice, which are analogues to a national 
government’s executive, legislative and judiciary systems. On the other hand, the 
other institution of the EU is dissimilar to a national governmental system like the 
European Commission. The Commission epitomizes supranationalism that lies at the 
centre of the EU system which is synonymous with the EU itself.1
                                               
1 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction To European Union, 2nd Ed., London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, p. 205.  
 In this context, one 
of the most important debates in European Union is about the effectiveness of the 
European Commission. In addition, it is also related to the competition of main 
integration theories: intergovernmentalism and supranationalism (neofunctionalism).  
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The idea whether the European Commission is powerful as an independent 
agent from the member states or not, can be examined from three different 
perspectives.  
The first is a theoretical perspective, which holds that perceptions of two 
theories differ from each other about the relative position of the Commission. One is 
Intergovernmentalists that perceive the Commission as relatively insignificant and the 
other that contradicts to the former one, is the supranationalists, which maintain that 
the Commission has an independent impact on policy outcomes.2
The second perspective is the historical and functional perspective and 
according to this perspective, the European Commission is an interesting institution 
due to its exceptional features compared to the other international organisations. This 
exceptionality was obvious that the Treaty of European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) had mentioned the Commission (the High Authority) as an independent and 
supranational decision-making organ. However, the High Authority model has expired 
on account of both some problems which had been occurred in the beginning of the 
ECSC Treaty and the failure of the European Defence Corporation EDC in 1954. The 
High Authority, which had blatantly supranational elements found within it
 
3
 
, was 
excluded from the EEC (European Economic Community) and European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom) Treaties. Its name and functions both were changed.  
Nevertheless, in the period of European integration, the Commission has led 
very important advances and in the last decade, member states have given more 
importance to the Commission. 
The impact of the member states on the Commission’s officials is the third 
perspective. In respect of the attitudes of the Commissioners, policy-making 
mechanism and the independent structure of the Commission can be affected by the 
member states. 
This work examines the influence of the relations between the member states 
and the Commission to the Commission’s position. From the aforementioned three 
perspectives, it is to be investigated whether the Commission is only as powerful as 
the member states allow it to be. 
 
 
                                               
2 Morten Egeberg, “The European Commission” in European Union Politics, (Edited by Michele 
Cini), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 131-147. 
3 Michelle Cini, The European Commission: Leadership, Organisation and Culture in the EU 
Administration, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996, p. 36. 
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1. Theoretical Perspective 
Theoretical infrastructure of the European integration has two different approaches 
that the supranationalists want to achieve a completely integrated Europe in all fields 
such as a state (a new federal state), and on the other side, intergovernmentalists 
who are defending the national states’ interests and they believe that, national 
governments are the real driving forces in the European project.    
Diez and Wiener suggest that the development of integration theory can be 
divided into three phases.4
By the first phase roughly lasting from the signing of the Treaty of Rome until 
the early 1980s, the European integration theory
 These three phases identified as explanatory, analytical 
and constructive, respectively, which are meant to identify the emergence, 
development and, from time to time, dominance of particular theoretical tendencies. 
5 begins proper. In this period two 
theoretical approaches came to dominate the debate. Both contending theories based 
on rational actor assumptions, while locating the push and pull for the integration 
process on different levels. On one side, neofunctionalists6 with their broad definition 
of integration7, and on the opposite side intergovernmentalists who explained 
supranational institution-building as the result of rational decision-making within a 
historical context that was conductive to strong and clearly defined interests of the 
nation state governments involved.8
                                               
4 Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (Ed.), ‘Introducing the Mosaic of Integration’, European 
Integration Theory, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 1-21.  
5 Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000. 
6 Neofunctionalists built on functionalism and kept part of its normative agenda, but they also 
introduced both a stronger emphasis on actors with an interest in, and therefore promoting 
further integration –primarily the Commission- and an explicit social scientific interest in 
creating a general theory of regional  integration that was applicable beyond the singular case 
of Europe. See Ernst B. Haas, “International Integration: The European and the Universal 
Process”, International Organization, 15(3), 1961, pp. 366-392; The Uniting of Europe: Political, 
Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967. 
7 “Neofunctionalists explained the move away from the anarchic state system and towards 
supranational institution-building by depicting particular societal and market patterns as 
pushing for elite behaviour towards common market building”. Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez 
(Eds.), ‘Introducing the Mosaic of Integration’, European Integration Theory, p. 8. 
8  Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (Eds.), ‘Introducing the Mosaic of Integration’, European 
Integration Theory, p. 8.  
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In the second phase, comparative and institutionalist approaches came to the 
foreground of integration theory, following questions of what kind of polity the EU 
really is and how it operates.9
In the third phase the influence of the International Relations Theory has 
enlarged on the integration theory. International Relations Theory was characterised 
by the rise of a variety of critical and constructivist approaches. This phase focused on 
substantial questions about constructing and limiting European integration.
  
10
 
 
Phase When? Main Themes 
Explaining integration 1960s 
onwards 
How can integration outcomes be 
explained? 
Why does European integration take 
place? 
 
Analysing governance 
 
1980s 
onwards 
What kind of political system is the EU? 
How can the political processes within the 
EU be described? 
How does the EU’s regulatory policy 
work? 
 
Constructing the EU 
 
1990s 
onwards 
How and with which social and political 
consequences does integration develop? 
How are integration and governance 
conceptualized? How should they be? 
                                               
9 A key process analysed was the “Europeanization” of governance rules, institutions, and 
practices across the EU. Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (Eds.), ‘Introducing the Mosaic of 
Integration’, European Integration Theory, p. 9; M. G. Cowles, J. Caporaso, T. Risse (Eds.), 
Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2001. 
10 It is in answering these questions that the critical and constructivist approaches in 
International Relations Theory were taken up. See Emmanuel Adler, “Constructivism in 
International Relations” in W. Carlianes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons (Eds.), Handbook of 
International Relations, London: Sage, 2002; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International 
Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik 
Jorgensen and Antje Wiener, “The Social Construction of Europe”, Journal of European Public 
Policy, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1999, pp. 528-544.   
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Since the beginning of the European integration, the efforts for formulating a 
theoretical account have occurred. For instance, Ernst B. Haas explained the initiation 
of the six West European countries, a new form of supranational co-operation after 
the Second World War by neo-functionalist theory.11 Neo-functionalism with the core 
concept of spill over was mainly concerned with the process of integration more than 
end-goals, that is, how an integrated Europe would look.12
On a number of occasions, the supranationalists argue that the Commission 
has even had a profound effect on the outcomes of “history-shaping” and frame-
setting IGCs (Inter Governmental Conferences) and European Council meetings. In 
addition, the institutionalists claim that treaty-based frameworks, which are the main 
focus of intergovernmentalists, need to be translated into practical politics through 
day-to-day policy making, and the Commission is one of the key actors, when it comes 
to this sort of crucial follow-up work.
  
13
After the mid-1960s, in the face of supranationalists, intergovernmentalism 
has been situated at the heart of the European integration theory.
 
14
By the 1990s, the debate on the transfer of sovereignty from the member 
states to Brussels replaced by a new divide between rationalist approaches, such as 
liberal intergovernmentalism and rational choice institutionalism, and constructivist 
approaches, which emphasized the potentially transformative potential of the EU.
 
Intergovernmentalism is drawn from classical theories of International Relations, most 
notably from realism or neo-realism. It sees and analyses integration as a zero-sum 
game and as an interstate bargaining. 
15 
Liberal intergovernmentalism -whose framework of analysis includes domestic and 
international interactions16
                                               
11 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957. 
12 Mark A. Pollack, “Theorizing The European Union: International Organization, Domestic 
Polity, or Experiment in New Governance?”, Annual Review of Political Science, 8, 2005, pp. 
357-398; Carsten Strøby Jensen, “Neo-functionalism”, in European Union Politics, (Edited by 
Michele Cini), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 80-92. 
13 Morten Egeberg, “The European Commission” in European Union Politics, p. 136. 
14 Michele Cini, “Intergovernmentalism”, in European Union Politics, (Edited by Michele Cini), 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 93. 
15 Mark A. Pollack, “Theorizing The European Union: International Organization, Domestic 
Polity, or Experiment in New Governance?”, Annual Review of Political Science. 
- is based on assumptions drawn from the rational actor 
16 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, 
International Organization, 42(3), 1988, pp. 427-460; Andrew Moravcsik, “Preferences and 
Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 31(4), 1993, pp. 473-524; “Liberal Intergovernmentalism and 
Integration: A Rejoinder”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 33(4), 1995, pp. 611-628; The 
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model, that it is influenced by the supposition that states behave rationally. This 
“means that the actions of states are assumed to be based on utilizing what are 
judged to be the most appropriate means of achieving their goals”.17
According to the intergovernmentalists (especially the liberal 
intergovernmentalists), the Commission has an important role to play in first pillar 
policies. Nevertheless, the pretension of liberal intergovernmentalists is the authority 
it exercises as an agenda setter and overseer of implementation at the national level is 
merely a derived and delegated authority.
 
18 “The Commission may facilitate 
intergovernmental co-operation, but it has no real power basis of its own, as the 
Commission’s powers are decided upon and framed by the member states within 
treaty negotiations”.19
2. The Evolution of the Commission and its Functions 
 
The first European Commission was set up in 1952 with the creation of the ECSC; 
under the name of High Authority which was a new type of institution responsible for 
both legislation and execution. Although these were not very fertile in this short 
period of ECSC and High Authority but it was the basis of the Commission. It 
resembled the French administration in terms of its structure and technocratic 
character20
Walter Hallstein was the first president of the Commission (1958-1967) who 
mainly shaped the existence of the Commission and fulfilled the setting up of 
Commission departments and the fortification of staff quickly, in order that policy-
making could get under way.
, and by the establishment of the European Commission in 1958, the 
functions of High Authority, the executive organ of the ECSC, was changed.  
21
                                                                                                                             
Choise for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, London: UCL 
Press, 1999; Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration. 
17 Neill Nugent, “The leadership capacity of the European Commission”, Journal of European 
Public Policy, 2(4), 1995, p. 609. 
18 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choise for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht. 
19 Morten Egeberg, “The European Commission” in European Union Politics, p. 135. 
20 S. Mazey, “Conception and Evolution aof the High Authority’s Administrative Services (1952-
1956): From Supranational Principles to Multinational Practices” in E. Volkmar Heyen (Ed.), 
Yearbook of European Administrative History 4, Early European Community Administration, 
Baden Baden: Nomos, 1992, p. 43. 
21 Michelle Cini, The European Commission: Leadership, Organisation and Culture in the EU 
Administration, p. 37. 
 In the period of 1958-62 the Commission was more 
concerned with promoting the Community concept than with seeking an 
unambiguous institutional identity for itself. “It did assert the political nature of its 
own role and it did try to increase its powers, but it did so within the basis institutional 
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framework laid down by the treaty and failed to propose measures designed to 
change the institutional system to its own advantage”.22
As an important milestone in the Commission’s shaping process, the 
Luxembourg Compromise of January 1966 brought to an end the so-called "empty 
chair" crisis that France having refused to take its seat in the Council since July 1965. 
This appeared to set limits on both, the integration process and the independence and 
initiative of the Commission. Even if the rhetoric was retained, it introduced a period 
of disenchantment with supranationalism in practice.
 Although, in the first few 
years of the Community’s existence, despite the most administrative and 
organisational problems the policy issues continued. 
After the establishment of institutional structure, the Commission has started 
to take shape by stages, in point of its functions and responsibilities. In spite of the 
changes of its functions in the process (from 1958 up to now), the Commission has 
always had an important role in the EU.  
23
It is described precisely in the Treaty of the European Union and reinforced by 
the Commission’s house rules that the European Commission has a constitutional 
obligation to set the legislative agenda in the European Union (Article 211, Treaty of 
the European Union). The Commission, unique among international institutions and 
unparalleled among executives in national democracies, has exclusive formal 
competence to initiate and draft EU legislation.
  
24
As an organ of the EU, the Commission has several functions and 
responsibilities. It can be said that the Commission is a think-tank and policy 
maker/initiator, manager and administrator, defender of the legal order, consensus-
builder, mediator and broker, mobiliser, guardian of the legal framework.
 
25 In another 
words, the Commission proposing and shaping legislation, administering and 
implementing Community policy, managing the budget, conducting external relations, 
policing Community law and pointing the way forward.26
                                               
22 Christoph Sasse, “The Internal Functions of the Commission”, in Sasse, C., Poullet, E., 
Coombes, D. and Deprez, G. (eds), Decision Making in the European Community, London: 
Praeger, 1977, p. 185. 
23 Geoffrey Edwards and David Spence, “The Commission in Perspective”, in Edwards, Geoffrey 
and Spence, David (Ed.), The European Commission, London: Cartermill, 1997, p. 1. 
24 Liesbet Hooghe, “Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International 
Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission”, International Organization, 59(Fall), 
2005, p. 863. 
25 Michelle Cini, The European Commission: Leadership, Organisation and Culture in the EU 
Administration; Neill Nugent, The European Commission, London: Palgrave, 2001. 
26 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction To European Union, p. 223. 
 With regard to the 
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interaction between the member states and the Commission, the following three 
functions are more important than the others.  
i. Executer: The Commission is the EU’s executive body in spite of it has 
only limited authority and ability to execute EU policies. This authority can be divided 
into two parts that are, some of these authorities are given to the Commission by the 
Council, and some of them are its own authorities. At the beginning it was a discussion 
matter that the Council would give an authority to the Commission according to which 
criteria, but the article 145 of Treaty of the EC (Article 202 Treaty of the European 
Union) put this entitlement in a rule. In order to this article the implementation 
authority of the rules that are in the Councils’ decisions will be given to the 
Commission as a principle.  
The Council took the decision (date 13 July 1987 and number 87/373) 
unanimously, concerning the Commission’s executive authority, which is called 
“Commitology” in the EU literature. The European Parliament declared its desire to be 
more active in the implementation process of the decisions which taken by co-
decision procedure, when the Maastricht Treaty had come into force. Thereupon, the 
Commission prepared a proposal in accordance with the modus vivendi which was 
signed on 20th December 1994 between the Council-the Commission and the 
European Parliament (OJ C 102, 4.4.1996). Consequently the decision dated 13th July 
1987 was abolished and the new Commitology decision was taken on 28th June 1999 
by number 99/468 (OJ, L 184, 17.7.1999).  
Commitology is an important point that exhibits how an authority is divided 
into three. “When performing its executive functions, the Commission is controlled by 
the member states through ‘comitology’”.27 In other words, the member states do not 
want to give this authority to the Commission itself.28
ii. Initiator: In accordance with the article 211 of Treaty of the EU, the 
Commission prepares the regulations of the Council and the Parliament. This authority 
is quite important that some writers call the Commission as “engine” in this 
framework (e.g. Burban 1997). It decides when regulation is necessary and how it 
should be devised. The Council of Ministers, which represents national governments, 
and the European Parliament, which is directly elected, may request the Commission 
to draft an initiative, but the Commission can, and sometimes does, refuse. The Treaty 
  
                                               
27 Hussein Kassim, “The Institutions of the European Union”, in Colin Hay and Anand Menon, 
European Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 192. 
28 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction To European Union, p. 227-229. 
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also instructs the Commission to serve the European interest. It also requires the 
Commission to be independent from any national government.29
iii. Guardian: The Commission is responsible for defending the European 
legal order, ensuring that member states and in some cases, companies and 
individuals, comply with the European rule of law.
 
30 This means that under article 226 
of Treaty of the EU, the Commission may bring a member state before the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) for alleged non-fulfilment of treaty obligations. Member states 
constantly fail to live up to their commitments, and the Commission betweenwhiles 
institutes judicial proceedings.31 Owing to this function of the Commission, some 
scholars call it a “watchdog (chien de garde)” (e.g. Prof. Pierre Henri Teitgen).32
This obligation of the Commission includes two dimensions. The Commission 
has to detect any kind of implementation deficit as a supervisor at first, and secondly 
it has to solve this deficit which essentially involves an enforcement mechanism.
 
33
The other milestone of the Commission’s evolution is the White Paper 
(reforming the Commission) which spells out the approach the Commission is taking 
as it operationalises its reform ambitions and also sets out the key themes that will 
structure the reform process.
 
34 According to the White Paper the Commission has to 
be independent, accountable, efficient, transparent35
In its report, the Commission declares its expectations and aims that a strong, 
independent and effective Commission is essential to the functioning of the European 
Union as a whole and its standing in the world. Substantial improvement in structures 
 and guided by the highest 
standards of responsibility. 
                                               
29 Liesbet Hooghe, “Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International 
Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission”, International Organization, p. 863; 
Neill Nugent, “The Deepening and Widening of the European Community: Recent Evolution, 
Maastricht and Beyond”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 30(3), 1992, 311-328. 
30 Michelle Cini, The European Commission: Leadership, Organisation and Culture in the EU 
Administration, p. 25. 
31 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Union, p. 233. 
32 J. L. Burban, Les institutions européennes, Paris: Vuibert, 1997; Michelle Cini, The European 
Commission: Leadership, Organisation and Culture in the EU Administration, p. 25-28. 
33 Michelle Cini, The European Commission: Leadership, Organisation and Culture in the EU 
Administration, p. 26. 
34 Morten Egeberg, “The European Commission” in European Union Politics, p. 134; Neill 
Nugent, The European Commission, London: Palgrave, 2001, p. 58-60; Hussein Kassim and 
Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos,  “The European Commission and the future of Europe”, Journal 
of European Public Policy, 14(8), 2007, pp. 1249–1270.  
35 See: John Peterson, “Playing the Transparency Game: Consultation and Policy-Making in the 
European Commission”, Public Administration, 73(Autumn), 1995, pp. 473-492. 
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and in systems is important for fulfilling the tasks established by the Treaties requires. 
The Commission’s effectiveness is inhibited now by working practices, conventions 
and obligations that have accumulated over decades. “Administrative reform will help 
the Commission to fulfil its institutional role as motor of European integration. It is 
thus a political project of central importance for the European Union”.36
As is seen at times and in different kinds of proposals, drafts or reform 
projects, the Commission wants to be independent and powerful for working ease, yet 
the member states always share out the authorities of the Commission with the other 
institutions as much as possible, albeit they show themselves such as willing for 
delegation of authority. If they want to obtain integration of the European Union in all 
fields the member states will need a powerful, independent and supranational 
Commission. Due to their national interests, they do not enable to strengthen the 
Commission.  
 
3. The Relationship between the Officials and the Member States 
 
By looking at the attitudes of commissioners/officials, the impact of the member 
states and the Commission can be understood, whether they decide neutrally during 
the preparation of proposals or they are under pressure and affected by the member 
states.  There are some important studies and surveys which investigate the 
behaviours of commissioners, especially during the controversial commission 
proposals, which demonstrate the strong and enduring coalitions between member 
states (national governments) and the officials of the Commission.37 Commissioners’ 
country role informs their actions more so than their duties (as a commissioner) or 
ideological affiliations.38
The commission has been variously theorized as a supranational actor with 
decision-making processes that are insulated from the interplay of national interests 
 
                                               
36 European Commission, Reforming the Commission, Consultative Document, Communication 
from Mr Kinnock in agreement with the President and Ms Schreyer, CG3 (2000) 1/17, 18 
January, Brussels: European Commission, 2000, p. 5. 
37 Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and Helen Wallace, The Council of Ministers, 2nd Ed., London: 
Macmillan, 2006, p. 227; Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 
London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 1999, p. 474; Robert Thomson, Jovanka Boerefijn, and Frans N. 
Stokman, “Actor alignments in European Union decision Making”, European Journal of Political 
Research, 43, 2004, pp. 237-261; Vincent Wright, “The National Coordination of European 
Policy Making”, in Jeremy Richardson (Ed.), European Union: Power and Policy Making, 
London: Routledge, 1996, p.152. 
38 Morten Egeberg, “Executive Politics as Usual: Role Behaviour and Conflict Dimensions in the 
College of European Commissioners”, Journal of European Public Policy, 13(1), 2006, pp. 1-15.  
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and as an agent of national interests.39
Liesbet Hooghe
 On the other side, as noteworthy findings 
show that, the practice can be different as it is seen from some research.  
40
Top commission officials are embroiled in a fierce struggle among political 
actors for control over EU authoritative resources. One would expect them to 
actively defend the power of the commission. If not, one would think that 
national governments successfully control them as agents serving national 
interests. However, variation in views among top officials is not easily 
understood in terms of principal agency. Commission officials are not simply 
supranational activists or intergovernmental agents. Rather, when they enter 
their office in the morning, they bring with them views on European 
integration that have matured as a result of experiences from various 
institutional contexts.
 examines the supranational and intergovernmental 
dimensions of the commissioners’ positions in her work. According to one of her 
studies, the effect of national governments on the commission officials and the three 
factors (prior experience of living abroad, socialization in the workplace, and learning 
in the political system of their country of origin) may influence them. In one of her 
work she evaluates the findings consequently:  
41
On the basis of her surveys it can be seen that the senior officials of the 
Commission are not insulated and they are aware of the fundamental issues that 
divide Europe’s parties, public and governments. As active participants in these 
debates they interpret, live and help reshape European governance day by day.
  
42
A recent survey demonstrates the commissioners’ attitudes during the 
decision process are important as well. Thomson’s survey is about the prime 
 
                                               
39 Robert Thompson, “National Actors in International Organizations the Case of the European 
Commission”, Comparative Political Studies, 41(2), 2008, p. 187-188. 
40 Liesbet Hooghe, “Supranational Activists or Intergovernmental Agents? Explaining the 
Orientations of Senior Commission Officials toward European Integration”, Comparative 
Political Studies, 32, 1999, pp. 435-463; “Images of Europe: Orientations to European 
Integration among Senior Officials of the Commission”, British Journal of Political Science, 
29(2), 1999, pp. 345-367; The European Commission and the integration of Europe: Images of 
Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001; “Several Roads Lead to 
International Norms, but Few Via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European 
Commission”, International Organization, 59(Fall), 2005, pp. 861-898. 
41 Liesbet Hooghe, “Supranational Activists or Intergovernmental Agents? Explaining the 
Orientations of Senior Commission Officials toward European Integration”, Comparative 
Political Studies, p. 460-461. 
42 Liesbet Hooghe, “Images of Europe: Orientations to European Integration among Senior 
Officials of the Commission”, British Journal of Political Science. 
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responsibility of commissioners in 70 controversial commission proposals introduced 
during the Santer and Prodi Commissions. He reaches three results after the 
investigation: 
…First, the division of policy responsibilities among commissioners has a 
significant impact on the level of agreement between the commission and 
member states’ positions… Second, this finding implies that commissioners’ 
country affiliations are an important guide to their behavior. This contrasts 
with the view of commissioners as being insulated from national pressures... 
Third, decision rules in the council condition the commission’s policy positions. 
When the unanimity rule applies in the council, the commission must appeal to 
all member states because all states must prefer or be indifferent between the 
commission’s proposal and the disagreement outcome.43
4. Conclusion  
 
The above results indicate that, according to commissioners, member states’ 
interests are more important than the European Union’s interests. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, two different approaches can be seen formulating the 
European integration process. Supranationalists look at the EU as idealists, which the 
popularity of this theory increases when the integration process succeeds – e.g. 
period of the ECSC, EURATOM and EEC’s establishment during the 1950s and early 
1960s. On the contrary, when the national interests differ from European goals, as it 
was from the 1960s through the early 1980s, intergovernmentalism comes into 
importance by its realist approach and since the “empty chair” crisis, 
intergovernmentalism has gained more supporters. The analysis (the level-of-analysis) 
of the intergovernmentalism is an important factor for its attractiveness in this point 
that, it analyses both national and international dimensions of the integration. 
Thus, the Commission, as a supranational organ, cannot be independent from 
member states in the issues that are based on interstate bargaining. On the other 
hand, all member states do not have the same ideas and considerations about 
European integration. The UK wants not a very strong European Union, whilst 
Germany wills a strong integration. On this point, member states might not desire a 
powerful and independent commission.  
Secondly, in the evolution of the Commission the member states have not 
allowed the Commission to have sole authority. Despite the recent progresses in the 
                                               
43 Robert Thompson, “National Actors in International Organizations the Case of the European 
Commission”, Comparative Political Studies, p. 187-188. 
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Lisbon Agenda (Reform Treaty), they have always shared out its authorities and rights 
to the other organs.  
From the third perspective, it can be seen that, both the member states 
always struggle for taking advantages in the Commission, particularly during the 
controversial proposals, by lobbying and the officials take decisions accordance with 
their national identities. Therefore the Commission’s neutrality and independence 
suffers.  
Finally, this essay demonstrates that, by looking from three perspectives, in 
spite of its important and independent functions, the Commission is affected by the 
member states strongly and it is only has been as powerful as the member states have 
allowed it to be, so far. 
Bibliography 
 
Adler, Emmanuel (2002), “Constructivism in International Relations” in W. Carlianes, T. 
Risse and B. A. Simmons (Eds.), Handbook of International Relations, London: 
Sage. 
Burban, J. L. (1997), Les institutions européennes, Paris: Vuibert. 
Checkel, Jeffrey T. and Moravcsik, Andrew (2001), “A Constructivist Research Program 
in EU Studies?”, European Union Politics, 2(2), pp. 219-249.  
Christiansen, Thomas, Knud Erik Jorgensen and Antje Wiener (1999), “The Social 
Construction of Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 
528-544.  
Christiansen, Thomas (2002), “The Role of Supranational Actors in EU Treaty Reform”, 
Journal of European Public Policy, 9(1), pp. 33–53.  
Cini, Michele (2003), “Intergovernmentalism”, in European Union Politics, (Edited by 
Michele Cini), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 93-108. 
 (1996), The European Commission: Leadership, Organisation and Culture in the EU 
Administration, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Cowles, M. G., Caporaso, J., Risse, T. (Eds.) (2001), Transforming Europe: 
Europeanization and Domestic Change, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Dinan, Desmond (1999), Ever Closer Union: An Introduction To European Union, 
Second Ed., London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Edwards, Geoffrey and Spence, David (1997), “The Commission in Perspective”, in 
Edwards, Geoffrey and Spence, David (Ed.), The European Commission, 
London: Cartermill, pp. 1-32. 
Egeberg, Morten (2003), “The European Commission” in European Union Politics, 
(Edited by Michele Cini), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 131-147. 
                                                                                                    ICES’09 
 
257 
 
Second International Conference on European Studies
 (2006), “Executive Politics as Usual: Role Behaviour and Conflict Dimensions in the 
College of European Commissioners”, Journal of European Public Policy, 
13(1), pp. 1-15. 
European Commission (2000), Reforming the Commission, Consultative Document, 
Communication from Mr Kinnock in agreement with the President and Ms 
Schreyer, CG3 (2000) 1/17, 18 January, Brussels: European Commission. 
Haas, Ernst B. (1961), “International Integration: The European and the Universal 
Process”, International Organization, 15(3), pp. 366-392.  
 (1967), The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Hayes-Renshaw, Fiona, and Wallace, Helen (2006), The Council of Ministers, 2nd Ed., 
London: Macmillan. 
Hooghe, Liesbet (1999), “Supranational Activists or Intergovernmental Agents? 
Explaining the Orientations of Senior Commission Officials toward European 
Integration”, Comparative Political Studies, 32, pp. 435-463. 
(1999), “Images of Europe: Orientations to European Integration among Senior 
Officials of the Commission”, British Journal of Political Science, 29(2), pp. 
345-367. 
2001), The European Commission and the integration of Europe: Images of 
Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
(2005), “Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International 
Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission”, International 
Organization, 59(Fall), pp. 861-898.  
Jensen, Carsten Strøby (2003), “Neo-functionalism”, in European Union Politics, 
(Edited by Michele Cini), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 80-92. 
Kassim, Hussein (2007), “The Institutions of the European Union”, in Colin Hay and 
Anand Menon, European Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 168-
199. 
Kassim, Hussein and Dimitrakopoulos, Dionyssis G. (2007), “The European Commission 
and the future of Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, 14(8), pp. 1249-
1270.  
Mazey, Sonia (1992), “Conception and Evolution aof the High Authority’s 
Administrative Services (1952-1956): From Supranational Principles to 
Multinational Practices” in E. Volkmar Heyen (Ed.), Yearbook of European 
Administrative History 4, Early European Community Administration, Baden 
Baden: Nomos. 
Moravcsik, Andrew (1991), “Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests 
and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community”, International 
Organization, 45(1), pp. 19-56.  
                                                                                                    ICES’09 
 
258 
 
Second International Conference on European Studies
 (1993), “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(4), 
pp. 473-524. 
 (1995), “Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Integration: A Rejoinder”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 33(4), pp. 611-628. 
 (1999), The Choise for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht, London: UCL Press. 
Nugent, Neill (1992), “The Deepening and Widening of the European Community: 
Recent Evolution, Maastricht and Beyond”, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 30(3), pp. 311-328. 
 (1995), “The leadership capacity of the European Commission”, Journal of European 
Public Policy, 2(4), pp. 603-623. 
 (1999), The Government and Politics of the European Union, London: Palgrave-
Macmillan. 
 (2001), The European Commission, London: Palgrave. 
Peterson, John (1995), “Playing the Transparency Game: Consultation and Policy-
Making in the European Commission”, Public Administration, 73(Autumn), pp. 
473-492. 
Pierson, Paul (1996), “The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist 
Analysis”, Comparative Political Studies, 29(2), pp. 123-163. 
Pollack, Mark A. (2005), “Theorizing The European Union: International Organization, 
Domestic Polity, or Experiment in New Governance?”, Annual Review of 
Political Science, 8, pp. 357-398. 
Putnam, Robert D. (1988), “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games”, International Organization, 42(3), pp. 427-460. 
Rosamond, Ben (2000), Theories of European Integration, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Sasse, Christoph (1977), “The Internal Functions of the Commission”, in Sasse, C., 
Poullet, E., Coombes, D. and Deprez, G. eds, Decision Making in the European 
Community, London: Praeger.  
Thompson, Robert (2008), “National Actors in International Organizations the Case of 
the European Commission”, Comparative Political Studies, 41(2), pp. 169-192.  
Thomson, Robert, Boerefijn, Jovanka, and Stokman, Frans N. (2004), “Actor 
alignments in European Union decision Making”, European Journal of Political 
Research, 43, pp. 237-261. 
Wendt, Alexander (1999), Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Wiener, Antje and Thomas Diez (Ed.) (2005), European Integration Theory, Oxford, 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
                                                                                                    ICES’09 
 
259 
 
Second International Conference on European Studies
Wright, Vincent (1996), “The National Coordination of European Policy Making”, in 
Jeremy Richardson (Ed.), European Union: Power and Policy Making, London: 
Routledge, pp. 148-169. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
